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Abstract 
 
This paper brings to the spotlight a topic which has been overlooked so far: the dual 
effects of media on corruption. Research has focused primarily on highlighting the 
positive effects of media in tackling corruption, although some authors have pointed 
out that media has also a harmful effect. The aim of this work is to reconcile these 
two approaches by establishing a conditioning; the level of media freedom. 
Conducting an OLS, the author has found that countries that have a larger degree of 
media freedom, the existence of more outlets, measured by the number of 
newspapers, decrease the level of corruption. However, when a country has low 
levels of free media, the result is the opposite; having more newspapers is harmful 
and thus it increases corruption.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The importance of media in contemporary societies has always been stated. The boost in 
literacy in the last century, along as the increase of civil rights, purchasing power, the 
technological evolution and the reduction of costs related to printing and broadcasting 
has triggered an effect on how people get informed. This evolution has leaded to the 
development of the media as we know it today. Lately, when the causes of corruption 
began to be an object of study and research, it has been found that media plays a salient 
role on the effects of corruption. Primarily, media are regarded as watchdogs (Norris 
2006), in a way that they monitor the acts of the bureaucrats and elected officials and 
provide us with vital information about their performances. Not only, thanks to media, 
we can assess their effectiveness, but we also raise concerns about their legitimacy. In 
democratic states, media’s role, combined with accountability mechanisms, enables 
citizens to punish politicians if their policies are not effective or if we acknowledge their 
role in corrupt practices. The stronger the media is, the smaller is the window of 
opportunity for the politicians to be embedded in corruption (Treisman 2000). 
 
Research has focused so far on the positive effects of media on corruption (Brunetti & 
Weder 2003, Freille et al 2005…) on the one hand, and few scholars on the other hand 
have tries to point out the harmful effects of free media on corruption and other aspects 
(Mullainhatan & Shleifer 2005, Vaydia 2005…). Other authors have highlighted several 
issues that have an impact on the relationship between media and corruption, such as 
education (Ahrend 2002), democracy (Chowdhury 2004), publicity (Lindstedt & Naurin 
2010) and different levels of accountability (Camaj 2012). They have found that the 
relationship between the two aforementioned variables substantially vary depending on 
the strength/development of their conditional variable.  
 
But does media have only positive effects? Recently Transparency International 
released their 2013 Global Corruption Barometer displaying that up to 41% of 
Spaniards respondents believe that the media is corrupt or extremely corrupt 
(Transparency International 2013). Therefore, Spaniards do not believe in the 
independence of the media, they consider it biased towards the two largest political 
parties, the conservative PP and the socialist PSOE, other institutions such as the 
Church or extremely interlinked with the economical power, such as the large 
companies or corporate tycoons. The society feels that media has lost its sacred 
independence and now respond only to economic and ideological clientelism (Cala 
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2013). Other countries where there is widespread perception of corruption within media 
according to the Transparency International Corruption Barometer are Egypt (80%), 
DRC (65%), Lebanon (65%), Greece (86%), Russia (59%), Sudan (68%) or Serbia 
(72%). 
 
Until now research has overlooked the dual effects of media in the sense in which are 
captured in this thesis. The existing literature has predominantly leaned towards the 
positive effects of media, although a minority of scholars have found opposite results. 
The aim of this paper is to test this positive-negative duality based on number of outlets 
(more precisely, quantity of newspapers) which is expected to be utterly dissimilar 
based on the levels of free media, and reconcile the two opposite approaches by 
displaying in which circumstances (levels of free media, as noted) the effects turn from 
positive to negative and vice versa. When free media is high, having more outlets 
(newspapers) increases the positive effect of media tackling corruption (positive media), 
whereas when the level of media freedom is low, having more outlets produce the 
opposite effect, that is, increasing the negative effect of media in curbing corruption. 
Therefore having more newspapers, which should be positive, as it prevents capture by 
the State (Djankov et al 2003, Besley & Prat 2006), reflects a larger plurality of ideas, 
although then the question of bias arises (see for example Mullainhatan & Shleifer 
2005, Baron 2006) and it reaches a larger public, only is desirable when a country’s 
level of media freedom is high. When a country does not have high levels of free media, 
media plurality has a negative impacts, in which case then a country should restraint the 
number of outlets available and have fewer number of newspapers.  
 
Drawing from the existing literature, three theoretical hypotheses that will contribute to 
debate, in particular, a dual effect theory, are to be tested in this paper. Firstly, whether 
freedom of press has a positive effect on corruption, as the majority of scholars have 
displayed. Secondly, testing whether a high level of media freedom enhances the 
positive effects of media plurality captured by the quantity of newspapers on corruption, 
and finally whether a low level of free media, as expected, harms the effects of media 
plurality on corruption, turning it negative, thus increasing the levels of corruption in a 
country. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Firstly, an introduction on the current research on 
corruption is described, following the explanation of the beneficial effects of media on 
corruption and the harmful effects of media on corruption. Secondly, based on the 
existing literature, the hypotheses are drawn and the author’s theoretical approach is 
described, pointing out the gap in the current research, the aim of the paper and the 
possible explanations of the expected results. Thirdly, the methodology is depicted, as 
well as the variables to be used in the analysis. Fourthly, the results are presented and 
discussed. The last section concludes.  
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2. Explanations of Corruption 
 
Corruption is usually understood as the misuse of public office for private gain 
(Bardhan 1997). This definition is open to a large variety of interpretations, such as 
obtaining benefits for a specific group (political party, private organization, NGO), 
offering/accepting a bribe to ensure that a particular service is provided, when the 
aforementioned service should be provided for free, it is illegal in its nature and should 
not be supplied at any cost or speed up the whole process (i.e. escalate positions in a 
queue for a organ transplant, registering a company…). Nonetheless, corruption is open 
to other situations, such as embezzlement, mismanagement of funds, influence 
peddling, electoral fraud and tax evasion, just to mention few significant examples. 
Bardhan (1997) himself suggests the when a country suffers rigid bureaucracy, bribing 
could accelerate the decision making. However, corruption is widely seen as the cancer 
of the modern societies, and countless articles have warned of the negative effects of 
corruption. The explanation of corruption exposed in this section is divided into two 
large groups: The non-media factors on corruption (that is, aspects that have effects on 
corruption unrelated to media) and the positive and negative effects of media on 
corruption (that is, freedom of media, circulation, ownership, competition and bias, 
among others). Up till now, a large majority of the research has explored the positive 
effects of media on corruption reduction. Nevertheless, some scholars have warned 
about the fact that media can surely have negative impacts on corruption reduction. The 
debate, although somehow neglected, is still present today. One of the goals of this 
paper is to shed some light into this tangled discussion and try to reconcile both 
positions. 
 
 
2.1 Prevailing Factors on Corruption 
 
Following Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2008) distinction between historical and contemporary 
roots of corruption, the former theories claim that the countries’ history play a major 
role in the corruption levels in contemporary societies. Religious factors seem to play an 
integral part in this intricate equation. Some religions are perceived of being more prone 
to corruption issues than others, and vice versa, as some researchers have found out. 
Particularly robust is the case of Protestantism. Researchers have found that Protestant 
countries, controlling for other influential factors, tend to have lower levels of perceived 
corruption (La Porta et al 1999, Treisman 2000, Sandholtz & Koetze 2000, Paldam 
2001), but also that other religions, particularly Islam and Catholic and Orthodox 
Christianity, increase the perception (Paldam 2001). This may have to do with greater 
tolerance for dissent in Protestant societies — or, by contrast, a more intense and 
unforgiving moralism. It may also reflect an institutional fact — that Protestant 
churches often developed in counterpoint rather than in fusion with the state and may 
thus have stimulated a more autonomous civil society (Treisman 2000:439).  
 
Ethnically fractionalized countries tend to be more corrupt (Mauro 1995, Alesina et al 
2003) due to the multiple ethno-lingustic division that might create a greater likelihood 
for conflict, clientelism based on ethnic group (more likely in Africa, where ethnic 
distinction plays a salient role) and rent seeking behavior, which makes governing 
extremely hard (Charron 2009, Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2008). Clientelism, either due to 
ethnic, linguistic, religious or other motives, will undermine the country’s effectiveness 
by placing well connected individuals within the political and/or economical network in 
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key positions (Kurer 1993), constraining thus the likelihood of the state to thrive, 
politically and economically. New and less developed democracies particularly suffer 
from this situation. Votes for favors or jobs are common in these countries, as the 
leaders are unable to commit to their pledged policies, preferring thus the easier and 
faster clientelistic networks (Keefer 2007, Keefer & Vlaicu 2008). 
 
Turning our attention to the contemporary effects, the initial striking papers found that 
low perceived corruption highly correlated with high economic growth (Mauro 1995, 
La Porta et al. 1999, Treisman 2000), blaming corruption for the countries’ low level of 
economical development. However, deeper research has displayed that economic 
development it is not the only reason for the persistence of corruption. Another widely 
studied aspect is the question of trade openness effects on corruption. Ades & Di Tella 
(1999) found that where local or national firms are sheltered by protective trade barriers 
and ineffective anti-trust regulations, foreign companies will have difficulties to 
penetrate in a country’s market, hence competition will be low and lead to corrupt 
practices. Similarly, in their study, Sandholtz & Koetze (2000) found the integration in 
the world’s economy should have a greater impact, both on business and the 
administrative culture of the country and Bonaglia et al (2001) that trade openness 
reduces corruption through three different mechanisms: trade restrictions are lowered, 
openness entails foreign competition and therefore more investors and interested in the 
country. Therefore, although some authors have not found significant relevance of trade 
openness (Treisman 2000), it is widely accepted that having a liberal trade system with 
other countries, enabling foreign competition, tackles corruption and rent seeking. In 
addition, some authors, such as Charron (2009), claim that, while trade openness has 
been proved as a reliable mechanism to curb corruption, social and political integration, 
coupled with free media, play a significant role in fighting corruption as well. 
 
Another important finding that research has found is that having natural primary 
resources is also highly correlated with high levels of corruption. Researchers have 
argued that having natural resources is actually a curse, since the extraction and trade of 
the primary resources crowd-out other sectors, such as manufacturing. People find it 
more rewarding to work on the extraction of these resources than working on other 
sectors of the economy, where the growth is substantially lower. This leads to a decline 
in the other sectors (manufacturing, or even entrepreneurship and innovation); leaving 
the entire country depending only in the extraction of natural resources (Sachs & 
Werner 2001), although history has proved that they are awfully volatile. This leads to 
the problems of rent-seeking behavior and it becomes a gold mine for corrupt 
opportunities (Ades & Di Tella 1999, Leite & Weidmann 1999, Barbier 2003). 
 
So perhaps we can control the corruption levels of a country when their leaders are 
accountable for their actions? It is said that democracy curbs corruption, but research on 
that topic has prove it that corruption does not decrease by establishing a democratic 
system per se. Bäck & Hadenius (2008) argue that the relationship between democracy 
and corruption resembles a J due to the fact that the effects of democracy are negative at 
low levels of democracy, non-existent at median levels and strongly positive at high 
democratic levels (1:2008). Using the Administrative Capacity as a variable, they argue 
that the quality is good in authoritarian states, it substantially decreases in “bad quality” 
democracies and it peaks when the country is a “good quality democracy”. They also 
argue that the reason the system works in the authoritarian countries is due to their firm 
and hierarchical grip from above, whereas in old established democracies is from below, 
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when the institutions function well. Other studies have reached the same conclusion, but 
in the shape of an U (Montinola & Jackman 2002) or an S (Sung 2004) instead, whereas 
other claim that what matters is in fact the “democratic years of exposure”, meaning that 
new democracies will always underperform compared to old established democracies 
(Keefer 2007, Treisman 2000) Others have found that the relationship between 
democracy and corruption is conditioned by the level of economical development, 
meaning that when economical development is low, democracies underperform 
dictatorships. However, when economical growth begins to increase, democracy ends 
up performing highly better (Charron & Lapuente 2010). 
 
The democratic impact on corruption is fostered when we include gender into the 
equation. There is compelling evidence that women are less selfish than men, and when 
women are highly embedded in public life, corruption is less likely to happen. It has 
been tested that countries which have greater representation of women in their 
governments and parliaments have lower levels of corruption (Swamy et al 2000, Dollar 
et al 2001). Nonetheless, this statement has been challenged with the argument that the 
relation between gender and corruption is spurious and it is caused by the liberal 
democracy, which promotes and enables gender equality and better governance (Sung 
2003). 
 
 
2.2 Existing Literature on Positive Effects of Media on Corruption 
 
Media acts as an information transmitter body, as citizens will always be updated with 
the latest political issues, thus they will be able to judge those issues, enabling them to 
modify their political decisions. If governments perform adequately, citizens will renew 
their confidence in them for another term. If they do not, citizens will use their power to 
punish them by ousting them out of office.  If more informed voters receive favorable 
policies, then mass media should influence policy because it provides most of the 
information that people use when they have to vote, but when the less access to media, 
the lower the share of informed voters and thus a higher likelihood a government will be 
involved in corrupt practices (Strömberg 2001). Furthermore, exposure to media leads 
to greater political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1989, Snyder & Strömberg 2010) 
and higher voter turnout (Snyder & Strömberg 2010). Nonetheless, the setback lies in 
areas where newspaper penetration is low, hence becoming isolated. This areas might be 
neglected by the politicians (for example, rural areas in less developed countries), 
whose lack of media access could reduce the availability and efficiency of public 
services (Keefer & Khemani 2005). Mentioned a bit below, Reinika & Svensson’s 
(2005) study is a great example on how to fight this and reverse the situation.  
Bottom line, media coverage increases voter information, leading to politicians being 
more controlled by the electors, hence better policies and higher risks of corrupt 
exposure and higher accountability. 
 
Now focusing on the effects of media and corruption, media has been tipped as the main 
control mechanism to curb corruption. Corruption is likely to flourish when the costs of 
being caught and punished are lower than the benefits of extraction rents via bribes, 
embezzlement or other methods (Treisman 2000) but as soon as accountability 
mechanisms and controls are implemented, the likelihood of bribery extraction 
substantially decreases, as it has the potential to restrain extortive corruption 
(government officials that might refuse or delay a service with the purpose of extracting 
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a bribe) and collusive corruption (when both stakeholders have a mutual benefit in the 
practice of corruption, such as tax evasion) (Brunetti & Weder 2003) but also raises 
public awareness, either due to tangible effects (independent journalism prompting 
official bodies to launch an investigation) and non-tangible effects (independent 
journalism can indirectly check corruption scandals by presenting them to the public 
debate) (Stapenhurst 2000), although the media’s major and widely known role is to 
monitor the actions of incumbents to use this information in their voting decisions. This 
can lead to government which is more accountable and responsive to its citizens’ needs 
(Beasley et al 2002). With regards of accountability, Camaj (2013) looked upon several 
measures of it: vertical and horizontal accountability. Her findings reveal that free 
media remain vital even when controlling for these two kinds of accountability 
processes, particularly countries with strong parliaments and an independent judicial 
system (see also Stapenhurst 2000). However, contrary to predictions, political 
competitiveness increases the levels of corruption, but she argues the cause might be 
due to the fact that “more political competitiveness increases the number of parties in 
the governing structures this increasing the number of people with whom the corruptive 
actions occur (2013:36).  
 
The “principal-agent” theory, commonly used both by political scientists and 
economists, has been also used to explain the relationship between media and 
governments/bureaucrats: the politicians and bureaucrats take the role of the agents and 
the citizens take the role of the principal. The issue lies on the fact that there is an 
asymmetrical information model between these two actors (Beasley et al 2002), and 
since the agents are either elected by the citizens (politicians) or they work for them 
(civil servants), the principals have the right to demand information to judge their 
effectiveness and good practices. This information might as well be wrong or imperfect 
as a measure to deceive the principals. It is then when the existence of the press 
becomes indispensable. Nonetheless, according to some scholars, when press freedom is 
low, the effects of higher education not only will not curb corruption, but will amplify 
its harmful effects, leading to elevated corruption. Yet, when the monitoring agency 
functions accurately (i.e. Media is free) the impact of education boots the efficiency of 
the aforementioned agencies, fulfilling its role in curbing corruption (Ahrend 2002). 
Likewise, in areas with no or barely press freedom, the impact of printed newspapers is 
very small, although radio has a more powerful effect (Francken et al 2005) while other 
authors highlight the fact that democratic states can, through voting, express their 
approval or disapproval of their politicians, and these, in order to get reelected, need to 
reduce corruption (Chowdhury 2004). Other articles, including the up to date the most 
nuanced study on the effects of press freedom and corruption by Brunetti & Weder 
(2003), and an in-depth study on Freedom of Press’ disaggregated data (political 
influences, economical influences and laws and regulations) by Freille et al (2007) have 
found significant results between the two aforementioned variables, but surprisingly one 
article failed to find any significance (Lederman et al 2005). 
 
However, some authors argue that making the information available will just not solve 
the problem. In a nuanced study, Lindstedt & Naurin, also using the “principal-agent” 
theory, (2010) argue that transparency without accountability and publicity is useless. 
But even when these conditions are met, the information must have a chance to reach 
the population, and on top of that, this information should be clear and concise to be 
comprehended by the citizens. This is what they call “Publicity”. “Accountability” is 
when, once the citizens have received, processed and analyzed the information, they 
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must possess mechanisms or procedures to punish the corrupt governments, which in 
general is through free elections, although it might also be through judicial resolutions. 
Therefore, the role of the media is highlighted as the salient watchdog and “middle 
actor” between the principal and the agent, as the risk of being exposed and hence 
getting caught increased when the “watchdogs” are able to provide sensitive and 
impartial information to the citizens (Norris 2006). Needless to say, in order to conduct 
this role, media must be free. Nonetheless, there are two drawbacks within the 
“principal-agent” theory applied to media are that the agents (the politicians) have to 
guess what the voters want, which, even when lobbying is permitted, complicates the 
principals’ tasks and secondly there is a multiplicity of principals, meaning the we could 
easily find principals’ with opposed demands, pulling the agents’ actions towards 
different directions (Beasley et al 2002).  
 
Another positive effect of media is the competition between the outlets. In other words, 
the existence of plurality (quantity) in media reduces the level of perceived corruption. 
The more plurality the media system of a particular country enjoys, the less media 
capture is likely to occur, as this plurality will hinder any capture likelihood (Besley & 
Prat 2006). When the media is captured, the political outcomes are affected negatively, 
due to the fact that bad politicians are more likely to engage in rent extraction, but at the 
same time they are less likely to be identified and thus replaced, leading to political 
dissatisfaction and consequently lower turnout (Besley & Prat 2006). The higher degree 
of media competition and press freedom induces government to control corruption 
harshly. Then, rent extraction becomes more difficult and the risk of getting caught 
substantially increases (Suphachalasai 2005). The latter paper also displays that media 
competition is economically more important than press freedom to tackle bureaucratic 
rent seeking. When a strong media market, particularly newspapers, that has enabled a 
simultaneous development of commercial media and media linked to different civil and 
political groups is coupled with long established democratic values and liberal 
institutions, formed by the cohesion of the aforementioned groups, the effects of media 
substantially increase, like in the Scandinavian countries, which are also characterized 
by having high levels of newspaper readership, hence enhancing their political 
information (Hallin & Mancini 2004). These authors call this system the “Democratic 
Corporatist Model”. But then in which environments is media capture more likely? 
Usually in less developed, non-democratic states, although it can also occur in 
developed democratic states, in a more subtle manner. Other policy decisions that affect 
media are through the regulation or entry, private barriers for private media companies, 
regulations that benefit the owner of a particular outlet or anti-defamation laws (Beasley 
et al 2002). 
 
The issues of freedom of media and media competition have already been explored, but 
there is another aspect of media that foster responsiveness and accountability and thus 
tackles corruption; the circulation and availability of media. Two examples of this are 
Reinika & Svensson (2005), Besley & Burguess (2002). They found large positive 
effects of media and the decrease of corruption on the one hand, and government 
responsiveness.  The former tested a newspaper campaign information in Uganda, 
aimed at reduce public funds capture. The goal of such campaign was to provide 
schools information on how to supervise local officer’s handling of the funds. The 
campaign was exceptionally successful, as not only corruption was tackled, but it also 
leaded to a sizeable boost on school enrolment, whereas the latter tested the 
responsiveness of the regional governments on calamity relief in India. The authors 
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argue that having more informed and politically active electorate reinforce the role of 
the governments to be responsive, and when newspaper circulation and electoral 
accountability are higher, governments are more responsive.  Likewise, other authors 
have stated that where the working infrastructure is prominent, the monitoring 
(circulation of newspapers) works and supports accountability, the countries are apt to 
decentralize their political and economical structure without amplifying the negative 
effects of corruption, whereas it is not recommended if the quality of the infrastructure 
is low, hence the newspapers cannot reach every single part of the country, undermining 
the monitoring process (Lessman & Markwardt 2010).  
 
 
2.3 Existing Literature on Negative Effects of Media on Corruption 
 
The issue of ownership has been widely discussed, and the results always point at the 
same direction. Media (both printed and broadcasted) can be either private or public, but 
what is the desirable situation? Should media be a private good, preventing any 
distortion and manipulation from the Government? In their study, Djankov et al (2003) 
analyze this issue, collecting data for both printed (newspaper) and broadcast 
(television) from 97 countries and the results they reached display that countries with 
more state ownership the media have on overall less freedom, there are fewer political 
rights, worse governance, inferior outcomes both in health and education. Moreover, 
these States tend to be poorer and have more autocratic regimes. Therefore, they were 
not able to find any perks of having a higher degree of State media ownership. They 
also state that when private, media uses to fall under large shareholders families hands. 
Following the impressions of Djankov et al on ownership, Besley & Prat (2006) found 
that, studying the impact of media ownership and political turnover, in societies with 
more press freedom their leaders/politicians tend to occupy the presidency or the prime 
minister position for a shorter period of time (when a country controls at least 30% of 
the press, the incumbent holds its position 7,21 years more), allowing thus a political 
renovation, hindering any likelihood of embedding in corrupt practices, although 
privatization might not always become the most suitable solution, as the business elites 
may close ties with the political (and also economical) elites (Stapenhurst 2000), 
creating thus the large media conglomerates whose influence it is sometimes beyond 
limits. These private large stakeholders might actually enhance media capture, privately, 
in this case, than when it is more diffuse and allows competition (Corneo 2006).  This is 
particularly delicate in less developed countries, although Europe has examples of its 
own. 
 
But even when the State media ownership is relatively small compared to the total 
available outlets of a country, this private quantity of outlets can hinder the positive 
effects of media tackling corruption. As they control this powerful “decision-making 
process”, they influence our election choices. And they may have different purposes for 
exercising this power. One of them is bias.  
 
Media can be biased as a result of the owners’ ideological preferences due to intrinsic 
political views or some kind of long-term relationship with the political actors, leading 
to capture (Prat & Strömberg 2011), or it might be due to journalist biased perception of 
an issue (Baron 2006). Nonetheless, the situation could be as well reversed when the 
force who produces this bias is not the owners or the journalists, but the citizens 
themselves. In this side, media organizations are assumed to be rational, hence trying to 
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maximize their profits. As rational entity, they would adapt their role to become more 
appealing to the public, meaning they would distort the information, providing exactly 
what the demanders desire, in order to maximize their benefits (Mullainathan & Shleifer 
2005, Prat & Strömberg 2011). Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005) argue that since the 
readers prefer to read news shaped in a way that fit into their ideology, media 
competition would not lead to better quality and accurate information due to pressure 
and rivalry with other media outlets as some authors claim (Besley & Burguess 2002, 
Djankov et al 2003, Strömberg 2001, Suphachalasai 2005), but rather to an augment in 
biased news (with the purpose of avoiding price competition), thus making media much 
less informative. Nonetheless, they state that this situation could be tackled when the 
reader has access (und uses it) to all news sources, as after reading different biased 
perspectives, the reader will build his own rational perspective. Then, according to 
Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005), reader heterogeneity is more important (and more 
accurate) than media competition.  
 
But even when these preconditions are fulfilled, citizen’s perceptions might still be 
biased. In a study about corruption perception and partisan bias, Anduiza et al 
(forthcoming in 2014) argue that the same offense is judged differently depending on 
the political party whose politician committed the offense, whether it is the respondent’s 
party, the opposite party or unknown party affiliation, meaning that corrupt politicians 
not only are not harshly punished, but they are reelected on the following elections. 
Partisans are more tolerant to corruption scandals when they affect their own party than 
when they affect their rival party, in particular when political knowledge is low. 
Partisans do not consider it important compared to other political issue, and finally, 
related to the question of media, because they do not give credibility to the information, 
as they think these maneuvers only pretend to sink and downsize the trustworthiness of 
a political party. This is particularly severe in politically polarized systems. However, 
the authors do not mention the role of media in these situations. If a country is 
polarized, the media will also be polarized, as the main watchdogs/transmitters of 
information will also become embedded with the political pluralism, especially on the 
adequate conditions and thus the citizens would consider that a particular media outlet 
would act against a particular party for the aforementioned motives. This will lead more 
divergent media perspectives and thus making media less informative, dampening the 
policy outcomes. People would be hostile to the ideologically dissimilar outlets simply 
because they differ from the citizens ideological preferences and would oppose them, 
becoming more suspicious towards the media (Arceneaux et al 2012). This situation 
takes place in countries where extreme political pluralism is high. A second relevant 
group by Hallin & Mancini in their study of the 17 western countries is the “Polarized 
Pluralist” system (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy) where media has until very 
recently oriented to an elite of influential citizens, in which the relationship between this 
elite and the media still remains as of today (strong instrumentialization between media 
and the political and economical power). Moreover, the outlets suffer from “external 
pluralism”, which means the existence of a decent-large variety of media outlets but 
with hardly different internal points of view. This means that the market is competitive, 
but the outlets are stuck in an ideological motionless position, which enhances 
polarization and it ends up affecting the political agendas, leading to political 
polarization. Latin American countries also could be categorized within the same 
system, although usually in more extreme forms (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2002).  
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Besides bias, other reasons are flooding the citizens with either irrelevant or complex 
information, as well as greed. Regarding the former, Balkin (1999) argues that media 
can hinder transparency as well as it helps it. He claims that governments and 
politicians might find useful to use media to enhance transparency, although they would 
do it through rhetoric and manipulation. In other words, transparency ends up being 
opaque. This can be done either by manipulating the presentation of information, for 
example, through diverting attention and supplying different information to crowd out 
and displace the actual central political issues and by providing tons of information, so 
that the “reader” will find it difficult to distinguish the actual information to the useless 
(unfiltered) and/or by providing the required essential information, but in a such 
complex language that few people would be able to process and understand (this is why, 
citing Lindstedt & Naurin, “publicity” is a compulsory requirement). And regarding the 
latter, Vaidya (2005) found that despite the media being regarded as watchdogs for the 
public, they might prefer to use the evidence to bargain with the incumbent, thus using 
this power to extract rents. He also states that media can come up with scandals to boost 
their profits, as they acknowledge that an inflated scandal would yield them with higher 
popularity, higher sales and hence larger benefits. Therefore, they might find profitable 
to create false allegations. However, these false allegations might lead to higher 
perception of corruption despite the fact they are completely made up, downsizing the 
country’s stability and international image. Likewise, although media competition’s 
impact on corruption deterrence is higher than when media monopoly, even when 
taking into account the possibility of raising false accusations, there are also 
circumstances when a media monopoly would perform better, or at least, it would not 
underperform media competition, particularly when it intensifies the effort on justifying 
false allegations (Vaidya 2005b). 
 
 
1.4 Tentative Hypotheses 
 
As explored in the former sections, corruption is affected by countless issues, such as 
the level of democracy, religion, natural resources and economic performance, among 
others, and the role of media on corruption is without doubt one of the most salient 
issues. Reviewed in the two latter sections, media affects positively on corruption by, in 
their role as watchdogs, enhancing accountability of the government or elected 
politicians, which constraints their rent-seeking behavior and oblige them to fully 
perform their duties as civil employees. Also, related with the previous statement, they 
are the “middle men” between the “agents” (governments) and the “principals” 
(citizens). They provide the citizens with valuable information, compensating the 
asymmetrical “principal-agent” model. Furthermore, on their role as watchdogs, their 
investigations may trigger a legal prosecution towards corrupt practices (Stapenhurst 
2000). Finally, a glance into circulation and competition has displayed that the former 
enhances government responsiveness, reduces funds capture and increases citizens’ 
information, as they can access media and the latter that reduces capture by the 
government and enables plurality of sources. Summing everything up, free media is a 
reliable and superior vehicle to curb corruption. This section presents the arguments, 
drawn from the existing literature, that shape the tentative hypotheses. 
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The goal of this paper is to test empirically the effects of media on corruption. Taking 
into account the existing literature, a beneficial role of media cannot be taken for 
granted, which might challenge the current state of “media is good to tackle corruption”. 
Firstly, because as research has shown, media encompasses countless issues and it is 
complicated to achieve results by only looking at the “qualitative” side of media, 
meaning whether media is free or not. Nonetheless, the results obtained by several 
scholars are important and shed some light upon a vital factor when studying the causes 
of corruption. Brunetti & Weder (2003) is one of the most relevant papers on the matter, 
and they indeed found, on a cross-country and a panel data study, the positive effects of 
media freedom to tackle corruption. Likewise, paired with education (Ahrend 2000) and 
democracy (Chowdhury 2004), the impact increases. Other papers (Treisman 2000, 
Freille et al 2007, Camaj 2012) also found positive results. However, there is a paper 
that failed to obtain significant results (Lerderman et al 2005).  
 
Consequently, the first hypothesis is to test the aforementioned statement of “free media 
reduces corruption” with the latest data available, although it is suspected that there will 
not be much change between the results and the literature, and using different control 
variables, exposed already on the Non-Media effects on Corruption. Due to 
overwhelming already explored results, the author expects a strong impact on media 
freedom on the levels of perceived corruption. That is the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Countries with more media freedom will have less corruption 
 
Additionally, the main goal of the paper is to fill a gap that it has been largely 
overlooked so far, the “dual effect” theory of media on corruption. Indeed whether 
media is free or not plays a pivotal role and the research so far agrees, but what about 
the “quantitative side” of media. The effects of media here are somewhat unclear. 
Djankov et al 2003 found that media ownership affects corruption negatively which was 
also displayed by Besley & Prat (2006), as they found that when the media market is 
wide and numerous outlets are part of it, the likelihood of capture by the State is 
reduced, as this plurality increases the risk of getting caught conducting corrupt 
practices, hence enhancing accountability and good practices if the rulers do want to be 
elected again. However, according to Mullainhatan & Shleifer (2005), media 
organizations are assumed to be rational, hence trying to maximize their profits. As 
rational entities, they would adapt their role to become more appealing to the public, 
meaning they would distort the information, providing exactly what the demanders 
desire, in order to maximize their benefits, especially if they also have partisan bias 
(Anduiza et al 2014). Therefore, they will only believe what the media outlet with closer 
ideology states. While this might be true, the authors have presumed that media is free. 
To make things clear, free media does not only apply to the lack of censorship by the 
government, but also to the existing laws and regulations protecting media and the 
ability of journalists’ to operate freely and without harassment, the penalties for 
defamation, transparency and costs of establishing a new media outlet…  
 
Therefore, here lies the goal of this paper, which highlights the current gap on the 
literature. The author agrees with Mullainhatan & Shleifer (2005) in their claims of 
media accommodating to the demands of their customers, but the effect substantially 
differs on the country. When a country enjoys a small extent of free media, a higher 
number of newspapers will lead to negative results. The authors argue that media bias 
produces bad outcomes and media outlets are not eager to give up their biased 
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perspectives because, as rational actors, they adapt the content of their newspapers 
adequately to the people with the purpose of maximizing benefits. They claim that the 
only way to solve this knotty situation is by extending the reading material, meaning 
reading all newspapers available. Then, the person would manage to isolate the effect of 
bias, producing his/her own opinion. Therefore, reader heterogeneity would solve the 
problem. But reading all available outlets is an unrealistic solution because, although 
ideal, nobody has the time, patience and/or resources to read all newspapers to diminish 
the media bias perception. Unless a person is completely dedicated on reading every 
single newspaper available, citizens will read a single outlet or perhaps two. 
Furthermore, although enlightening, they do not take into account another vital concept: 
partisan bias. If the country suffers from partisan bias, citizens will regard all media 
outlets located far from their ideology as noise and unreliable information (Arceneaux et 
al 2012). This situation is particularly punitive in countries where a polarized political 
system exists. In their study, Hallin & Mancini (2004) found that the Southern European 
countries suffer from a polarized political system that it is reflected in their media 
system (Anduiza’s et al 2014 study was conducted in Spain), and that leads to a strong 
competitive market where unfortunately media is stuck in a particular ideological 
position and thus influences and enhances the polarization of the system. Hallin & 
Papathanassopoulos (2002) found similar results in their study on media systems in 
Latin America (which, according to them, should not be at shocking, as not only they 
share the language – Portuguese, Spanish- but also a history in public administration). 
Nevertheless, Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) study is focused only in European countries 
and in a comparative way, and despite similarities with other countries, extrapolating 
the result to other countries would undermine reliability as it would disregard some vital 
characteristics of these countries.  
 
It is plausible to expect that leaders of countries with low free media might want to 
display that they actually do support media plurality by enabling other outlets to operate 
as disguise, but failed to be conceived as such. Therefore, their attempt to simulate free 
media would end up being a failure, as the citizens, businesspeople… would react 
negatively, downswing the positive effects of media on corruption. Albeit, even if 
citizens do not oversee the situation, the international community might negatively react 
upon it. That might lead to worse indicators that would undermine trade, investment 
etc… After all, corruption is not only perceived within a determined country’s borders, 
but worldwide. It could also be that the media outlets are tangled with the economical or 
political powers (Freille et al 2007 found that, disaggregating the Freedom of the Press 
index, only the Economical and the Political influences did have an impact on 
corruption). As stated by Stapenhurst (2000) and Comeo (2006), media might be 
controlled by few stakeholders, particularly large companies, whose interests are 
interlinked with the ones who hold the executive power, using their influence on the 
rulers to produce strict rules to hinder the creation of new independent outlets. 
Therefore, plurality might exist in a particular country, but it would be controlled by an 
oligopoly, hindering the positive effects of media. If media is controlled or owned by 
few large stakeholders or other actors with political power or political links, they most 
likely use their power to dictate the headlines of their newspapers according to their 
values, becoming then not a source of information or a watchdog, but a propagandistic 
mean for their own benefits or for the ones who hold the power. Stapenhurst exposes 
two examples of Russia and Tanzania. Nonetheless, although enlightening, his paper 
only provides some case examples and Comeo uses a mathematical model in his 
analysis. 
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The last expected mechanism is that leaders in countries particularly exposed to weak 
democratic traditions, democratic instability, weak administrative apparatus or low 
economic performance (Bäck & Hadenius 2005, Charron & Lapuente 2009) might find 
useful to use media through rhetoric and manipulation, either by diverting the attention 
or providing irrelevant information (Balkin 1999). As the levels of media freedom will 
be low, the citizens would not be (or hardly) aware that media is being used for the 
politicians’ benefits instead of fulfilling their role as watchdogs, particularly if 
accountability is not ensured. Or perhaps they do supply of the information, but unless it 
is easily and clearly explained for the citizens, they will not be able to comprehend the 
received information. This is perfectly explained in Lindstedt & Naurin (2010). The 
information might be public or it might not be. Depending on how the “publicity” 
mechanism is applied, they might end up producing the same outcomes. Obviously, if 
there is no transparency, governments, elected officials and bureaucrats most likely will 
be embedded in corrupt practices, relying in the opaque system that will protect them of 
being caught. However, even when there is transparency, if this transparency does not 
clearly reach the citizens, the agents will be in a similar situation if there was no 
transparency, engaging again in corrupt practices. Therefore, media plays a salient role 
in correcting this loophole. If media is not free, more newspapers would not improve 
this issue. Government officials will use the newspapers to distort the reality for their 
own benefits, hiding vital information but at the same time appearing to their citizens as 
a transparent administration. They will provide irrelevant information, which would in 
turn flood the citizens with utterly insignificant information, distracting them from the 
real problems, and supplementing new realities that crowd out and eventually displace 
other political and relevant issues (Balkin 1999). 
 
Taking all these potential theoretical mechanisms into account, the second hypothesis is 
as follows: 
 
H2: When free media is low, media plurality has a negative effect on corruption  
 
However, the positive effect of having a higher number of newspapers is to be expected 
when the country enjoys a large degree of freedom of media, displaying the 
aforementioned dual effect of media on corruption. As the degree of media freedom 
improves, media’s role as watchdogs will be enhanced as well, as competition (i.e. more 
number of newspapers) will try to increase their benefits, hence providing their 
customers with news, particularly about corruption scandals. Thus customers not only 
buy the newspapers, but will consider them reliable in their role of watchdogs of the 
system. Competition will encourage the newspapers to do in-depth research about 
corruption, since another outlet could as well uncover a breaking-corruption scandal. 
Suphachalasai (2005) conducted a theoretical mathematical model and found that free 
media coupled with media competition decreases corruption. This paper challenges his 
results firstly by conducting an empirical model instead, taking into account other 
variables that he did not add in his theoretical model and by arguing that when media 
freedom is low, the result turns out to be the exact opposite, something he does not 
reference in his paper. Nonetheless, at the same time this paper aims at partially 
corroborating his claim, but stating the media competition’s results are positive when 
free media is high. Another of Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) models is the Democratic 
Corporatist, in which the Scandinavian countries are the perfect examples. Liberal 
institutions and the democratic values are long established and the media market 
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becomes embedded with these traditions. The result is a country where media plurality 
and readership is high, despite some outlets being considerably biased.  
 
Drawing upon the existing literature on media freedom, and presuming that the first 
hypothesis will turn positive, as expected, journalists and media outlets in countries 
with higher freedom of press will enjoy further liberty to proceed with their tasks as 
watchdogs, therefore achieving greater results and putting under pressure possible 
officials (Stapenhurst 2000), who at the same time, due to this media freedom, could be 
threaten by the media’s discoveries. Thus, the likelihood of being caught raises, 
becoming much more difficult to illegally extract rents (particularly if we take into 
account the likelihood of being ousted out of office if the information goes public). 
Media competition would simply put more pressure on these elected officials. Having 
said that, the author strongly disagrees with the theoretical model constructed by Vaidya 
(2005), in which he claims that media, as a rational actor that only seeks to increase its 
profits, would be tempted to blackmail the public officials in order not to disclose 
delicate information. While this could be true in countries with low free media, it is 
unlikely to succeed in high free media countries, as unless the government pays a bribe 
to all media outlets (Besley & Prat 2006), it is uncertain that one outlet would be able to 
engage in blackmailing the government, completely unnoticed by other outlets who 
could divulge this situation, thus exposing the “rogue” outlet.   
 
Returning to the already explained “principal-agent” theory, the media plays the role of 
the “mediator” between the agents and the principals (Lindstedt & Naurin 2010). Its 
task it is to inform the citizens with the agents’ procedures and results, which the latter 
might be tempted to hide (asymmetrical information). In order to for them to perform 
adequately, media must be free a have certain level of plurality, otherwise this lack of 
existing mediators may hinder transparency (Lindstedt & Naurin 2010), leading to more 
corruption. When media is free, and coupled with plurality (i.e. number of newspapers), 
the positive effect on corruption is magnified. The existence of several sources of 
information available will not only either directly or indirectly smoothly encourage 
governments to enhance their transparency laws and mechanisms, but also media will 
act as “controllers” of the quality of information provided by the governments. If the 
governments try to deceive and provide wrong, biased or incomplete information, the 
outlets will be aware and will acknowledge this make this deceitful information public, 
so citizens will know that the government is trying to hide vital information. The more 
number of newspapers, the more likely they will realize whether the government is 
being honest or deceitful. 
 
The third and final hypothesis is thus as follows: 
 
 H3: When free media is high, media plurality has a positive effect on corruption  
 
Bottom line, the existing literature has predominantly leaned towards the positive 
effects of media as watchdogs, but a minority of scholars has warned about the 
hazardous effects of media. The aim of this paper is thus to try to reconcile these two 
major approaches by showing in which circumstances media has positive effects on 
corruption, such as enhancing control of the governments and elected officials and in 
which others media as a negative effect, such as covering corrupt scandals or creating 
diversions to distort reality. Indeed the positive and negative results discovered have 
expanded the knowledge in the matter. However, the main drawback of the 
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aforementioned papers is that they tend to consider the quality of media as something 
equal in every country or they create some models to explain their purposes. While 
enlightening, those papers fail to emphasize this essential characteristic, therefore it 
becomes somewhat unreliable to extrapolate their results worldwide. This paper wants 
to show that the aforementioned papers were right, but at the same time they were also 
wrong, due to this lack of information. As stated by the author, media plurality and 
competition will indeed have positive results (see for example Strömberg 2001, Besley 
& Burguess 2002, Djankov et al 2003, Suphachalasai 2005 and Besley & Prat 2006) but 
only when media enjoys a large extent of freedom and independence, whereas media 
plurality will have negative effects (see for example Balkin 1999, Mullainathan & 
Shleifer and Vaydia 2005). Furthermore, while the positive effects of media on 
corruption have been explored (even if mostly in theoretical models), research has so far 
not investigated the negative impact of media plurality on corruption.  
 
 
2. Data & Methods 
 
The method used in this paper is an OLS with one and two + an interaction term 
(depending on the model) independent variables, controlling for several other factors 
highlighted in the literature review which have in impact on corruption.  
 
 
2.1 Dependent Variable 
 
Measuring corruption is it its core considerably complex. To begin with, because 
corruption is in its nature illegal and there are not official records. Therefore, we need to 
rely either in corruption perception measurements or in reported experience in 
corruption. In this paper a corruption perception index is used. 
Corruption perception measurements are the most widely used tool, despite the severe 
flaws, but they are commonly regarded as the most accurate measurement of corruption. 
The most famous indexes are the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index, the World Bank’s (World Governance Indicators) Control of Corruption and the 
Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide. Although highly correlated, 
the three indexes are slightly different but they are often used for robustness tests of 
each other. 
 
This paper uses the WGI Control of Corruption designed by Kaufmann et al (2010), 
which it is a weighted database with the mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 1, the 
observations run from around -2,5 to 2,5 with the higher values corresponding to better 
corruption controls. The indicators for Control of Corruption are based on several 
variables from 31 diverse data sources, both capturing perceptions of grand and petty 
corruption by business consultancies, domestic and international business people, non-
governmental organizations, survey respondents and public sector organizations 
worldwide. From their inception in 1996 till 2002 they released their indexes 
biannually, but after 2002 they started producing them every year. In order to use the 
most reliable but updated information possible on corruption, the paper employs the 
data from the year 2011. 
Choosing an adequate measurement of the dependent variable was problematic, but the 
author finally decided upon the WGI because its broadness; the World Bank team 
includes all countries when there is at last one component rating available, enhancing 
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country coverage. The fact that both the CPI index and the ICRG index are among the 
sources used to produce the WGI indicator played a major role, as their outputs are 
taken into account, summing it up with other sources. 
Finally, there were two drawbacks with the other two measurements. Firstly, as I 
wanted to use the latest data available, the ICRG was out of my reach since it is not a 
free database, and due to economical constraints, the latest index available for free is 
from 2002, available through the Quality of Government Database (Teorell et al 2011), 
besides the fact that the aforementioned indicator tends to overemphasize the business 
perceptions on corruption, and disregards other vital aspects such as the grassroots 
perceptions’, and secondly, the latest CPI index has been modified from the previous 
years and in a hypothetical panel data the results would be utterly different due to the 
measurement. Although a time series cross-sectional research is unlikely at the time 
being, using the WGI leaves an open door for a future research in the matter. 
 
 
2.2 Independent Variables 
 
The primary focus of this paper is to analyze the effects of media in corruption. But as 
stated in the former section, media is portrayed in two different ways. One the one hand, 
media is analyzed according to its freedom, and on the other hand, it is analyzed 
according to the countries’ media plurality, in other words, the number of the newspaper 
outlets. 
 
The former variable is measured by Freedom of the Media by Freedom House, a think 
tank that is known for elaborating indexes on political rights and civil liberties. The 
Freedom of the Media index was firstly constructed in 1996, and they have been 
publishing it yearly since then and now is regarded as one of the major indexes of media 
freedom worldwide, widely used between researchers (see for instance Ahrend 2002, 
Brunetti & Weder 2003, Chowdhury 2004, Lindstedt & Naurin 2010 and Camaj 2012) 
and civil society organizations to raise awareness of the status of one of the most 
indispensable rights in the world. The index is constructed upon three different 
dimensions of press freedom: the Legal Environment, which encompasses both laws 
and regulations that could influence media content and the government’s inclination to 
use these laws and institutions to restrict the media’s ability to operate, such as 
penalities for defamation, the ability of the journalists’ to operate freely etc; the Political 
Environment, where the degree of political control over the media content is evaluated, 
such as the censorship status, the media diversity in a country and the ability of 
journalists to proceed with their work without harassment etc; and finally the Economic 
Environment, which includes transparency and concentration, costs of establishing a 
new media outlet and distribution etc. The Freedom of Press index is rated from 0 to 
100, being 0 maximum level of press freedom and 100 being maximum violation of 
press freedom. Despite being a continous variable, Freedom House also divide the 
countries into three large groups: when the countriy’s media freedom ranges from 0-33, 
their media is regarded as Very Free (we find among these members most of the OECD 
countries), from 34-66 they are Partially Free and finally from 67-100 they are Not Free. 
(Freedom House 2012). In order to avoid confusion, the author has reversed the index 
prior the regressions, meaning that 0 has become Not Free and 100 has become very 
Free. In order to display the most accurate and updated results, the data used is from 
2012. 
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The indicator for quantity of media outlets was taken from the UNESCO statistics 
database, and the indicator “Number of daily titles per 1 million inhabitants” is used as 
a proxy. The calculation is easy, they measure the number of newspaper outlets 
available in each country, although they establish certain conditions: indeed they focus 
on daily newspapers; publications intended for the general public and mainly designed 
to be a primary source of written information on current events connected with public 
affairs, international questions, politics, etc, reporting events that have occurred in the 
24-hour period before going to press (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012). Like in 
the other main independent and the dependent variable, the latest update was employed, 
which in this indicator was 2004. However, when no data from 2004 was available, data 
from the previous year was employed, and if there was unavailability, the previous year 
and so on. Nonetheless, data from most of the countries is drawn upon the years 2004, 
2003 and 2002.  
 
Why is “Number of Newspapers” used to measure Media Plurality/Competition? 
Firstly, the broadcasting media has been disregarded due to several reasons: One reason 
is the pay-per-view channels, which are difficult to capture, and then to consider 
whether they should be included or not, and the second reason, and perhaps the most 
essential, is that the costs of broadcasting remain, as of today, significantly high for 
some countries, particularly less developed countries. Secondly, although radio stations 
could have used, the author has preferred using the oldest media outlet, newspapers. 
Moreover, the required infrastructure for radio stations is more complex and expensive 
than for newspapers. 
 
The author has decided to establish a population threshold with the purpose of 
disregarding the observations of cases which would have slightly jeopardized the 
outcome of the research (some of these islands are unusual cases regarding newspapers 
titles per 1 million inhabitants. They always appear among the countries with more 
plurality, simply because they have two or three outlets for less than 70.000 
inhabitants). Those countries are basically little islands from the Caribbean and the 
Pacific. Therefore, the population threshold established was countries with more than 
300.000 inhabitants. Population thresholds have already been implemented in other 
research papers focusing on corruption (see for example Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2008). 
 
 
2.3 Control Variables  
 
The control variables employed in this paper are drawn upon the presented literature 
used by other researchers. The selection of the variables and the measurements used 
remain my own. 
 
A log of the 2011 GDP/per capita, calculated by the World Bank is used in the 
regressions. Due to the importance of GDP, this variable will be employed in all 
models. As the academic world has showed (Mauro 1995, La Porta et al. 1999, 
Treisman 2000), high accumulation of wealth is associated with low levels of perceived 
corruption.  
 
Ethnic fractionalization is also used in this paper, as research (Ades & Di Tella 1999, 
Alesina et al. 2003) have shown that countries with higher levels of ethnic 
fractionalization are more prone to corrupt practices to benefit the members of their own 
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ethnic group or community, engage in rent-seeking (Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2008) and 
developing a clientelistic network (Kurer 1993) that undermine efficiency and increase 
corruptin, compared to homogenous countries. The variable here is drawn upon the 
work of Alesina et al (2003), in which reflects the probability of two randomly selected 
people belonging to a different ethno linguistic group. 
 
 The percentage of Protestants in a society (as of population in 1980, except for new 
countries, in which case it is used between 1990 and 1995) is also employed from the 
work of La Porta et al (1999) through the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al 2011), 
and as research has demonstrated (La Porta et al 1999, Treisman 2000, Sandholtz & 
Koetze 2000, Paldam 2001), the higher the percentage of Protestants in a country, the 
lower levels of corruption this country has. It might have to do with the fact that 
Protestantism have greater tolerance and a more intense moralism, or perhaps on 
account of and institutional fact, as the Protestant churches often developed in 
counterpoint rather than in fusion with the state and may thus have stimulated a more 
autonomous civil society (Treisman 2000:439).  
 
As noted in Chowdhury (2004), media and democracy play a salient role in curbing 
corruption; however the effects of democracy as previously stated are unclear (Treisman 
2000). Democracy, in lower levels, not only does not tackle corruption, but it increases 
it. It could be due to the lack of administrative capacity (lack of economical resources to 
create and a force that implements the policies, lack of legitimation, usually relevant in 
post-conflict societies etc) (Bäck & Hadenius 2008, strong clientelism networks (Keefer 
2007) that would undermine the positive effects of democracy. Instead, a more suitable 
indicator has been tested empirically in research, displaying more accurate results; years 
of democracy. This paper uses Treisman’s measurement (2000) of consecutive years of 
democracy through the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al 2011), which it captures the 
years of consecutive democracy from 1930 until 2000 (Democratic countries are those 
with a score of 6 or higher in Beck et al (2001) index). 
 
Trade openness is widely regarded of downsizing the effects of corruption, as foreign 
companies are able to penetrate in a country’s market when effective anti-trust 
regulations and non protective trade barriers (Ades & Di Tella 1999), it would also have 
a greater effect on the business and the administrative culture (Sandholtz & Koetze) or 
through competition among foreign investors (Bonaglia at al 2001), although some 
scholars have found no significant relevance (Treisman 2000). The indicator used in this 
paper is by the Fraser Institute from the year 2010, which measures the presence of 
economic freedom in a country according to taxes on international trade, regulatory 
trade barriers, actual size of the trade sector compared to expected size, difference 
between official exchange rate and black market rate and international capital and 
market controls. A higher number indicates more openness.  
 
As noted in the literature, women are less prone to corrupt practices than men (Swamy 
et al 2000), and that has been proved by the aforementioned authors and Dollar et al 
(2001), showing that parliaments with larger representation of women have lower levels 
of corruption. The data used in the paper is from the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 2002, 
through the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al 2011). 
 
Another variable used in the models is the natural resources rents as a percentage of the 
GDP from the World Bank in the year 2008. There is a vast literature exploring the 
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punitive effects of having natural resources when eradicating corruption, as it crowds-
out other industry sectors with lower growth (Sachs & Werner 1999), rent-seeking and 
increased the likelihood of conflict, which in turns also boosts corruption (Ades & Di 
Tella 1999, Leite & Weidmann 1999, Barbier 2003). 
 
Vital terms such as democracy, transparency and accountability have been explored, but 
in the end, without a strong free and effective judicial system, the corrupt officials 
might turn out to be unpunished, undermining all the efforts of tackling corruption. 
Therefore, I decided to use a variable that captures the independence of the judicial 
power from the executive and the military and ensures a free and fair system to punish 
corrupt officials. The data is drawn upon the Cingranelli & Richards database (2010) 
from the year 2006, which captures the extent of judicial freedom, ranging from 0 (not 
independent), 1 (partially independent) and 2 (fully independent). 
 
 
3. Results  
 
Before displaying the results, it is essential to remember two details. Firstly, Freedom of 
Media’s scale has been reversed, meaning that now 0 means Not Free and 100 means 
Very Free. Secondly, when including an interaction term, when significant, the 
subsidiary coefficients can only be interpreted independently when the other value is at 
its lowest value. A table containing the descriptive statistics is to be found in the 
appendix (Appendix 1). Moreover, some of the variables might be strongly correlated. 
Firstly, the interaction term will be highly correlated with the two interacted variables, 
free media and number of titles, which may modify the effect and significance of the 
media freedom in the models when the interaction is present. A table containing the 
correlation values between the independent variables is included in the appendix 
(Appendix 2). 
 
Table 1 displays the models designed to test the first hypothesis (countries with more 
free media have less corruption) as well as the models to test the second and third 
hypotheses. Models 1-5 for the first hypothesis and models 6-13 for the following two.  
The first model is a simple bivariate model between Freedom of the Press and Control 
of corruption and the following models include separately the control variables. The 
basic models shows, not taking into consideration any variables that might affect the 
relationship between Free Media and Corruption, that there is indeed a positive and 
significant relationship between the inspected variables 
 
The second model adds the log of GDP per capita, which is regarded as one of the 
strongest control variables. The aim is to test whether the relationship between the 
independent and the dependent variables holds. That result was expected. The log of the 
GDP per capita is positive and significant. Moreover, there is barely any effect on Free 
Media, as it remains positive and significant. In model 3 some control variables (Ethnic 
Fractionalization, Natural Resources Rents and Independence of the Judiciary) are 
introduced to rest the reliability and robustness of the variable. We can see, despite the 
impact of the aforementioned control variables, that Free media remains positive and 
significant. Withdrawing the three control variables and adding four different control 
variables (Protestantism, Women in Parliament, Trade Openness and Years of 
Consecutive Democracy) the result remains unchanged. Free Media still remains 
positive and significant. Both models 3 and 4 support the existing literature on free 
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media and corruption, as well as the first hypothesis. However, this affirmative 
statement is challenged in model 5, when all control variables are introduces at once. 
Unfortunately, and contrary to most of the existing research, Free Media loses all its 
significance. However, as previously stated, this might be the result of high correlation 
between the independent variables. Therefore, the first hypothesis is supported in 
models 3 and 4 (models 1 and 2 are basic models but using them to reaffirm and support 
the first hypothesis would be deceitful, due to the lack of control variables) but at the 
same time the author finds thus similarities with Lederman et al (2005) as they did not 
find significance in their measurement of free media and corruption, although it might 
probably be due to high correlation between several variables, as noted. Some of them 
are closely interlinked with free media and that might have produced this loss of 
significance of the aforementioned variable. 
 
Models 6 to 13 capture the goal of the following two hypotheses, hence the aim of the 
paper. Model 6 displays the relationship between the two independent variables, the 
interaction and the strongest control variable available, which is GDP(log). 
Disregarding any control variable, this model prove that hypotheses 2 and 3 are true, 
highlighting the dual effect of media on corruption. When a country enjoys a 
considerable media freedom, more newspapers boosts the positive effects tacking 
corruption. However, as stated in hypothesis 2, when the situation is the exact opposite, 
meaning a country does have a low degree of media freedom, media plurality not only 
does not have a positive effect curbing corruption, but it worsens it. More newspapers 
increase the corruption perception of the country, displaying the other side of the 
aforementioned duality of media.  
 
The variable Titles represent the countries with low free media (at its lowest value) 
whereas the interaction term displays the opposite effect, when free media is at its 
highest value. Both variables turn out significant and the expected direction. Whereas 
the interaction term is positive, the variable Titles is negative, confirming hypotheses 2 
and 3. Models 7, 8 and 9 include 4 different control variables to check whether the 
achieved results in model 6 hold or if it is just the effect of the control variables 
included. As it can be observed in all models, some control variables turn out to be 
important, particularly Trade Openness, Natural Resources Rents and Independence of 
the Judiciary, as well as the GDP per capita. But most important is the fact that the 
results displayed in model 6 hold both significant and on the expected direction. When 
free media is high, having more newspapers leads to a positive effect tackling 
corruption. When free media is low however, media plurality has a negative effect on 
corruption fighting. Models 10 and 11 include one more control variables than the 
former 3 models, and the results hardly vary. 
 
Model 12 includes one more control variable than the previous model and finally the 
last model, number 13; include all variables at once. like in model 5, in order to check 
the effect of all control variables together in the results. However, unlike model 5, when 
the main independent variable loses significance, we now observe that the results 
remain significant. Even when all control variables are included, the dual effects of 
media remain, gaining significance compared to other models where not all variables 
where included. Furthermore, five control variables become significant in the last model 
(GDP, Trade Openness, % Protestantism, % Natural Resources Rents and Independence 
of the Judiciary) while others, % Women in  Parliament, Consecutive Years of 
Democracy and Ethnic Fractionalization have no relevant impact at all as they are 
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Table 1: The effects of Media Freedom, Media Plurality and the interaction of both on Control of Corruption 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Media 
 Freedom 
0,030*** 
(0,002) 
0,019*** 
(0,002) 
0,007* 
(0,003) 
0,008* 
(0,003) 
0,001 
(0,004) 
0,013*** 
(0,003) 
0,004 
(0,003) 
0,001 
(0,004) 
0,002 
(0,004) 
0,002 
(0,004) 
0,005 
(0,003) 
-0,003 
(0,004) 
-0,001 
(0,004) 
Titles — — — — — 
-0,157** 
(0,059) 
-0,266** 
(0,083) 
-0,153* 
(0,069) 
-0,188** 
(0,062) 
-0,257*** 
(0,070) 
-0,322*** 
(0,081) 
-0,134* 
(0,069) 
-0,240** 
(0,083) 
Titles*MF — — — — — 
0,003*** 
(0,001) 
0,004*** 
(0,001) 
0,002* 
(0,001) 
0,003*** 
(0,001) 
0,003*** 
(0,001) 
0,004*** 
(0,001) 
0,002* 
(0,001) 
0,003** 
(0,003) 
GDP/Capita — 
0,332*** 
(0,033) 
0,357*** 
(0,039) 
0,236*** 
(0,045) 
0,284*** 
(0,54) 
0,355*** 
(0,036) 
0,269*** 
(0,048) 
0,270*** 
(0,059) 
0,396*** 
(0,043) 
0,347*** 
(0,004) 
0,428*** 
(0,043) 
0,347*** 
(0,051) 
0,347*** 
(0,059) 
Trade 
Openness 
— — — 
0,233*** 
(0,061) 
0,183** 
(0,063) 
— 
0,205*** 
(0,059) 
0,231*** 
(0,059) 
— — — 
0,166** 
(0,059) 
0,163** 
(0,061) 
% Women 
Parliament 
— — — 
0,009 
(0,006) 
0,008 
(0,006) 
— 
0,011 
(0,006) 
— — 
0,010* 
(0,005) 
0,010 
(0,005) 
— 
0,007 
(0,006) 
Consecutive 
democracy 
— — — 
0,008** 
(0,003) 
0,004 
(0,003) 
— 
0,007* 
(0,003) 
— — 
0,004 
(0,003) 
— 
0,005 
(0,003) 
0,003 
(0,003) 
% Protes 
tantism 
— — — 
0,008** 
(0,003) 
0,008*** 
(0,002) 
— — 
0,008** 
(0,003) 
— — 
0,005 
(0,003) 
0,007** 
(0,002) 
0,006* 
(0,003) 
Nat. Resour 
ces Rents 
— — 
-0,009*** 
(0,002) 
— 
-0,009* 
(0,004) 
— — — 
-0,009*** 
(0,002) 
-0,010*** 
(0,002) 
-0,012*** 
(0,002) 
-0,034* 
(0,069) 
-0,011* 
(0,004) 
Independen
ce Judiciary 
— — 
0,303*** 
(0,079) 
— 
0,204** 
(0,083) 
— — 
0,234** 
(0,085) 
0,249*** 
(0,076) 
0,159* 
(0,075) 
— 
0,240** 
(0,079) 
0,0169* 
(0,082) 
Ethnic Fract 
ionalization 
— — 
0,107 
(0,195) 
— 
-0,046 
(0,203) 
— — — 
0,161 
(0,196) 
— 
0,116 
(0,194) 
— 
0,052 
(0,198) 
Constant 
-1,583*** 
(0,125) 
-3,874*** 
(0,246) 
-3,669*** 
(0,326) 
-4,462*** 
(0,357) 
-4,191*** 
(0,424) 
-3,761*** 
(0,268) 
-4,231*** 
(0,368) 
-4,323*** 
(0,332) 
-3,678*** 
(0,341) 
-3,319*** 
(0,306) 
-3,921*** 
(0,343) 
-3,862*** 
(0,335) 
-4,271*** 
(0,431) 
R2 0,498 0,695 0,755 0,806 0,833 0,740 0,817 0,800 0,788 0,830 0,827 0,829 0,852 
Nº 173 159 149 114 111 147 126 125 140 122 118 124 107 
Note: *p<0,05; **p<0,01; ***p<0,001. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: Control of Corruption (WGI)
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not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the result that really matter here is that 
hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported. Even when all control variables are included (as well 
as different combinations of control variables added separately) the duality remains 
significant and with the expected direction. Note that in all models, free media loses 
significance. Nevertheless, this is to be expected due to the inclusion of the interaction 
term between free media and number of titles. 
 
Due to the variables used in model 13, the number of observations is reduced to 107, 
but remains strongly supported by the fact that the model is significantly large. Thus, 
when a country has free media, the effects of media plurality are beneficial, whereas 
when a country does not have free media, the effects of having more newspapers have 
the opposite effect, harmful impact on corruption. In other words, the fewer newspapers 
these countries have the higher control of corruption they will achieve. 
 
Some examples of this kind of countries are Venezuela, Russia, Iran and Equatorial 
Guinea. Disregarding the latter due to its size and population (small countries tend to 
have more number of newspapers per inhabitant, due to their low population), the 
former three countries are a perfect example. Three large countries with high population 
where numerous newspaper outlets coexist score relatively low compared with other 
similar countries. Their history of state-controlled media or the political, religious and 
economical links between the media and the government are widely acknowledged, 
proving my point that more newspapers, in specific conditions, do not lead to higher 
control of corruption. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature as it questions and challenges some central 
findings between media and corruption while trying to reconcile two opposite 
approaches. The relationship between freedom of media and control of corruption was 
tested using updated data and the achieved results slightly vary from the predominant 
perspective. As expected, in the bivariate model, the relationship between both 
aforementioned variables is strong, also when including the effects of GDP in the 
regression. However, the relationship slightly fades when introducing two sets of 
control variables and disappears when all control variables are included. Therefore, the 
paper partially agrees with the current literature, although at the same time it fails to 
find a significant relationship when other variables are introduced.  
 
Nonetheless, the main contribution is the predicted dual effect of media and corruption. 
The author has found compelling evidence that the quantity of media outlets, measured 
by number of newspapers, has both beneficial and harmful effects on corruption levels 
depending on the degree of media freedom. When countries enjoy larger levels of media 
freedom, having more newspaper produces a positive outcome that reinforces the 
beneficial effects of freedom of press. Therefore, media truly acts as not only as 
information providers, as they transmit vital information which citizens use to evaluate 
the government’s performance, renewing their confidence of ousting them out of office 
as a punishment, but also they act as watchdogs, monitoring their activity and creating 
constraints for them to be engaged in corrupt practices. 
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Competition will encourage the newspapers to do in-depth research about corruption, since 
another outlet could as well uncover a breaking-corruption scandal, and due to this plurality, 
governments do not have the ability and the resources to capture the existing media outlets, as 
it would become too costly to silent them all. Furthermore, the role of media in these 
countries would put pressure upon the bureaucrats not only to deliver and to increase their 
efforts in curbing corruption. 
 
However, when countries do no not have free media or have lower levels of such, media 
plurality, measured by number of newspapers, has a harmful effect in corruption. Not only 
does not tackles corruption, but it increases it (negative effect). I hypothesize that this 
situations is especially sensitive in countries that suffer from polarized political systems. This 
polarization might lead to disregard every single piece of news that does not fit into a 
person’s conceived ideology, taking offence for whatever information that contradicts or 
opposes his personal beliefs or his own party, while at the same time overemphasizing the 
importance and reality of the news published in his/her preferred outlet, meaning any corrupt 
rumor affecting the opposite party would be taken as a fact whereas any corrupt rumor 
affecting his own party would be taken as noise. If the outlets are controlled by large 
companies linked with the executive, legislative, judicial or military power, the same effect 
might also occur. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Nº Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Control of 
Corruption 
173 -0,1140 1,00406 -1,72 2,42 
Media Freedom 173 49,50 23,895 3 90 
Newspaper Titles 158 2,6794 3,20662 0,04 16,06 
GDP/Capita (log) 159 8,5141 1,57127 5,44 11,65 
Trade  
Openness 
140 7,007 1,1362 1,8 9,4 
%  
Protestantism 
163 11,4086 20,00461 0,00 97,80 
% Women in 
Parliament 
141 13,8433 9,35923 0,00 45,00 
Consecutive 
Democracy 
165 18,01 21,937 0 70 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
164 0,4581 0,25574 0,00 0,93 
Natural Resources 
Rents 
167 13,872 22,0765 0,00 149,3 
Independence 
Judiciary 
169 0,93 0,795 0 2 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation table between IVs 
Note: ** bilateral correlation at p<0,01. * bilateral correlation at p<0,05
 MF Titles MF*
T 
GDP  
Log 
Trade 
Op 
Wom 
Parl 
Cons 
Dem 
Protes Nat 
Rents 
Ind 
Jud 
Eth 
Frac 
Media 
Freedom 
1           
Titles 0,538 
** 
1          
MF*T 0,61 0,684 
** 
1         
GDP/Capita 
log 
0,535 
** 
0,583 
** 
0,407 
** 
1        
Trade 
Openness 
0,595 
** 
0,373 
** 
0,230 
** 
0,662 
** 
1       
% Women 
Parliament 
0,377 
** 
0,329 
** 
-0,55 0,319 
** 
0,276 
** 
1      
Consecutive 
democracy 
0,632 
** 
0,393 
** 
-0,30 0,605 
** 
0,419 
** 
0,456 
** 
1     
% 
Protestantism 
0,439 
** 
0,429 
** 
-0,24 0,256 
** 
0,064 0,504 
** 
0,427 
** 
1    
% Nat Res- 
ources Rents 
-0,474 
** 
-
0,177
* 
0,56 0,026 -
0,352 
** 
-
0,102 
-
0,288 
** 
-
0,150 
1   
Independence 
Judiciary 
0,725 
** 
0,387 
** 
-0,20 0,519 
** 
0,456 
** 
0,381 
** 
0,587 
** 
0,393 
** 
-
0,311 
** 
1  
Ethnic Fract- 
ionalization 
-3,01 
** 
-
0,233 
** 
-0,66 -
0,492 
** 
-
0,397 
** 
0,177
* 
-
0,399 
** 
-
0,106 
0,181
* 
-
0,296 
** 
1 
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